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The Clinton Court is Open for Business:
The Business Law Jurisprudence of
Justice Stephen Breyer
Edward A. Fallone*
In October 1994, Chief Judge Stephen Breyer of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit became the 108th person to serve on the United
States Supreme Court He joins a Supreme Court that has decided relatively
few business law cases in recent years,2 but which gave corporate america a
few notable victories during the 1993-1994 Term? With the ascension of
Justice Breyer to the Court, business persons and corporations might well
expect that in future years the "Clinton Court" will become even more
sympathetic to their legal concerns. Unlike President Clinton's first nominee
for the Supreme Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who wrote relatively few
business law opinions while an appellate judge and who often seemed to defer
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; J.D. and B.A.,
Boston University. The author formerly served as a member of the Supreme Court
Nomination Task Force advising Senator Herb Kohl (D-Wis.) on the Breyer
nomination.
1. Linda Greenhouse, Plaudits Drown Out Critics As Senate Confirms Breyer,
N.Y. Tlms, July 30, 1994, at A6. The full Senate voted 87-9 in favor of
confirmation. Id.
2. See Kenneth W. Starr, Rule of Supreme Court Needs a Management Revolt,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1993, at A23 (blaming the low number of business law cases
decided by the Supreme Court in recent years on disinterest on the part of law clerks
and inordinate clerk influence over the "cert pool"); see also Kenneth W. Starr, Rule
of Trivial Pursuits at the Supreme Court, WALL ST. 3., Oct. 6, 1993, at A17.
3. See, e.g., Central Bankv. First Interstate Bank, 62 U.S.L.W. 4230 (U.S. 1994)
(Rule lOb-5, the anti-fraud provision adopted pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, does not authorize private actions imposing liability on those who aid and
abet the primary violator-a holding which benefits the legal and accounting
professions); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 62 U.S.L.W. 4627 (U.S. 1994) (punitive
damage awards that are not subject to judicial review and modification violate due
process); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 62 U.S.L.W. 4576 (U.S. 1994) (state or local
government may not condition the grant of permission for real estate development on
the owner's dedication of some portion of the land for public use unless there is a
rough proportionality between the dedication and the development's impact);
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 62 U.S.L.W. 4487 (U.S. 1994) (tort liability of
professionals who failed to uncover insider wrongdoing at savings and loans is a
question of state, not federal, law); see generally Alan M. Slobodin, Justices Weigh In
On Business, NAT'L. L. J., Aug. 15, 1994, at C6.
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to the views of her more conservative colleagues on the D.C. Circuit in such
cases,4 Justice Breyer has shown an active interest in economic regulation
affecting industry, in antitrust law, and in securities law. This essay will
explore Justice Breyer's overall judicial philosophy as it relates to business
law issues, as well as his views on substantive law in this area. His numerous
appellate opinions, as well as books and law review articles on related topics,
provide an extensive "paper trail" and allow some preliminary conclusions to
be drawn concerning Justice Breyer's business law jurisprudence.
I. NTRODUCTION
Beginning with the ill-fated nomination of Judge Robert Bork to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1987, and continuing throughout the
Reagan and Bush presidencies, the selection of Supreme Court nominees and
their subsequent confirmation hearings have been portrayed by some
commentators and the popular media as a battle between the Left and Right
wings of the political spectrum.5 Too often, observers of the confinmation
process have eschewed an objective examination of the nominee's "theory of
judging"-their judicial philosophy-in order to clothe the nominee with a
particular political ideology.' Prior opinions of the nominee have been
scrutinized for liberal or conservative outcomes, rather than for an analysis of
the reasoning behind those outcomes
4. See Edward A. Fallone, Neither Liberal Nor Laissez Faire: A Prediction of
Justice Ginsburg'sApproach to Business Law Issues, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 279,
299.
5. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFRMATION MEss: CLEANING UP THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 6-11 (1994) (arguing that conservatives and liberals
alike have focused on ideology to argue against a nominee, rather than allowing the
nominee and her backers to make a positive case); DAVID O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL
ROULBTTE 99-106 (1988) (describing the battle over the Bork nomination).
6. See CARTER, supra note 5, at 16-20, 51-52 (describing a media culture
incapable of transmitting complicated messages concerning the views of a Supreme
Court nominee).
7. See CARTER, supra note 5 ("The public-including, perhaps, much of the
bar-does not particularly care how the nominee will reach her results. The public
cares only about what results the nominee will reach."). See, e.g., Jon Gottschall,
Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts ofAppeals: The Continuation of a Judicial
Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48, 51 (1986) (classifying judicial appointees by ideology
solely on the basis of outcome; conservative appointees are characterized as more
likely to vote contrary to: 1) prisoner claims in prisoner's rights cases, 2) claims by
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The nomination process for the Supreme Court has taken a welcome turn
towards civility under President Clinton. The Ginsburg and Breyer
nominations have been notable for the lack of partisan attacks on either
nominee. However, analysis of the nominees' prior judicial record by the
media and some observers continues to be outcome oriented rather than theory
based. This single-minded attention to the ultimate "winners" and "losers" in
a case creates the illusion of a particular political ideology on the part of the
judge, with little true predictive value.
For example, much of the reported criticism of Justice Breyer's
nomination was outcome oriented. Critics of Justice Breyer's nomination
often noted that a 1991 survey' of the voting records of both Carter and
Reagan appointees in antitrust cases found that Justice Breyer cast 16 out of
17 possible votes in favor of what could be deemed the "conservative" result;
yet no attempt was made to analyze the reasoning behind those votes?
Justice Breyer was also labeled "anti-consumer" largely because he wrote an
antitrust opinion overturning a verdict won by a consumer group.10 Media
characterizations of Justice Breyer labeled him as "unfeeling" and a perennial
defender of corporate interests."
8. See William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the
1990s, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. 49, 95-96 (1991).
9. See Holly Idelson, Breyer's Liberal, Conservative Mix Seems to Assure
Confirmation, CoNG. Q., May 21, 1994, at 1305-07; see also Paul M. Barrett, Supreme
Court Nominee Wins Business'Approval, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1994, at B1.
10. See Hearings on the Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
(July 12, 1994) [hereinafter Hearings on the BreyerNomination] (questioning of Sen.
Metzenbaum) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File. Senator Metzenbaum,
in a discussion of Justice Breyer's opinion in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co.,
915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991), characterized the ruling
as being "more worried about ruffling the regulators [sic] feathers than protecting the
consumers." Hearings on the Breyer Nomination, supra.
11. See Neil A. Lewis, Friends and Foes TestifyAbout BreyerN. Y. T]MEs, July
16, 1994, at A10 (reporting on the testimony of Ralph Nader before the Senate
Judiciary Committee). Justice Breyer's decisions have also been characterized as
"devoid of emotional flair and polemics" and "uninspiring," see Eva Rodriguez,
Rulings Reveal Little of Judge Breyer's Heart, LEGAL Tams, May 23, 1994, at 1,
while he has been accused of "reducing the law to cold economic principles" in his
extra-judicial writings, see Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, RiskRegulation Stance
May Prove a 'BreyerPatch', NAT'L L.J., May 30, 1994, at A12. It is not surprising
that, in what might be viewed as an attempt to defuse such charges, Justice Breyer
repeatedly stressed his desire to serve on the Supreme Court in order to "make the
average person's ordinary life better." See Paul M. Barrett, High Court Choice is
Strong Thinker Who Offers Something for Everyone, No Distinct Agenda, WALL ST.
J., May 16, 1994, at A22.
1994]
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The purpose of this essay is not to speculate concerning Justice Breyer's
personal political ideology. Nor is this essay intended to tabulate the interest
groups that have emerged as "winners" and "losers" in Justice Breyer's past
rulings. Instead, it is assumed that an examination of the basic principles
employed by Justice Breyer in the formulation of legal rules will provide the
most appropriate basis for an analysis of Justice Breyer's judicial philosophy.
Therefore, this essay will attempt to identify the basic assumptions and modes
of reasoning that underlie Justice Breyer's consideration of business law
issues.
These basic assumptions and methods, employed on a fairly consistent
basis by Justice Breyer, reveal a judicial philosophy in regards to business law
questions that, while mixed, can generally be characterized as
"conservative." 2  Elements of a "conservative" judicial philosophy in a
business law context can be defined to include (1) a tendency to interpret
federal statutes in a way that causes the least restriction on corporate activity
in the marketplace;'3 (2) a preference for simple and clearly articulated legal
rules that are easy for the courts to administer and that allow individuals and
businesses to anticipate the legal consequences of their conduct; 4 (3) a faith
12. No normative connotation is intended by the use of the term "conservative;"
it is used merely as a descriptive term. While much effort has been devoted to
defining the contours of a "conservative" versus a "liberal" judicial philosophy in the
context of constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., DAVID KAiRYs, WITH LmmTrY AD
JusTIcE FOR SOME: A CRITIQULE OF THE CONSERVATIVE SUPREME CoURT 182-91
(1993) (describing the application of economic analysis to constitutional principles);
BERNARD SCIvARTz, THE NEW RiGHT AND TBE CONSTTTIoN 4-5 (1990) (arguing
that conservatives and liberals alike have championed judicial activism in order to
further their distinctly different goals); James G. Wilson, Constraints of Power: The
Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Boric, Posner, Easterbrook and Winter, 40
U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 1171 (1986) (analyzing the effect of conservative jurisprudence on
liberal values), less time has been spent on an examination of how competing judicial
philosophies may lead to contrary results in business law cases. But see Kovacic,
supra note 8, at 53-54, 59-71. To a great extent, however, the insights gained from
identifying differing theories of interpretation in the area of constitutional law can be
applied to other areas of the law as well.
13. See Kovacic, supra note 8, at 53 (one aspect of conservative judicial
approach is desire to limit government intervention in the economy); Carl W. Tobias,
Rethinking FederalJudicialSelection, 1993 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1257, 1258 (conservatism
is marked by a narrow interpretation of congressional statutes and the limited grant of
acces§ to federal courts to aggrieved individuals); see also William E. Kovacic, The
Reagan Judiciary and Environmental Policy: The Impact of Appointments to the
Federal Courts of Appeal, 18 B.C. ENVTL. APR. L. REV. 669, 686-96 (1991).
14. See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust.
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221,
1240-41 (1989) (Chicago School economic analysis of the law includes a consideration
[Vol. 59
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in the ability of individuals and entities to bargain in their self-interest and a
corresponding reluctance to limit potential contractual arrangements; 15 (4) a
restrictive view of access to federal court in cases where the plaintiff possesses
a claim in another forum; 6 (5) respect toward corporate activity that is
designed to increase economic efficiency;17 and (6) deference to the decisions
of administrative agencies acting within their sphere of authority. 8 The
manner in which each of the above elements has informed Justice Breyer's
business law jurisprudence will be discussed in turn.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES
A. Regulatory Restrictions on Corporate Activity
Justice Breyer has faith in the self-regulating function of a competitive
market. In his extra-judicial writings, he is generally skeptical of government
intervention in the marketplace-particularlywhere the government intervenes
in the form of direct agency regulation of industry. 9 His judicial opinions
of the costs of administering a proposed legal rule).
15. See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L.
REv. 431, 498-502 (1993) (identifying two rationales for judicial adoption of a
pro-market theory of contract law: the promotion of economic efficiency and the
preservation of individual autonomy).
16. See Doug Bandow, The Conservative Judicial Agenda: A Critique, in
EcoNoMIc LIBERTIES AND THE JUDIciARY 265 (1987) (arguing that the imposition of
restrictions on lawsuits in federal court is one part of the conservative judicial agenda);
Tobias, supra note 13, at 1258; John C. Yang, Standing... In The Doorway of
Justice,59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1356, 1356-57 (1992) (identifying a tendency among
conservative jurists to closely scrutinize both the extent of the asserted injury and the
causal link between the injury and the relevant government action).
17. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23 (1992)(economic efficiency is the principal criterion for judghing the desirability of legal
rules). Adherents of the so-called "Chicago School" of law and economics have been
identified as espousing a conservative judicial philosophy focusing on the promotion
of economic efficiency and wealth maximization. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW
AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATrV APPROACH 60-66 (1990); see also HARRY FIRST
ET AL., Antitrust and a Dynamic Economy, in REVrrALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS
SECOND CENTuRY 91-93 (Harry First et al. eds. 1991) (placing the Chicago School in
context with other economic approaches to antitrust law).
18. See Kovacic, supra note 13, at 694 ("[O]ne element of the conservatism
attributed to Reagan appointees may be a prudent judicial unwillingness to engage in
policymaking functions for which the courts are institutionally ill-suited.").
19. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGuLATION AND ITS REFORM 156-61 (1982);
Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Deregulation in the United States: Airlines,
1994]
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are generally similar, in the sense that they express a wariness of indirect
government intervention in the marketplace. For example, he often seeks to
avoid expansive interpretations of congressional statutes, such as the antitrust
laws, where such an interpretation would unduly restrict free competition
between firms. In addition, Justice Breyer's judicial opinions exhibit a
sensitivity to the costs of regulation and to the effect that regulation has on
business interests.
1. Economic Regulation
In his 1982 book, Regulation and Its Reform, Justice Breyer sets forth a
critique of economic regulation. "Economic regulation" can be defined as
government efforts to control price, production, and quality decisions made by
private industry due to a belief that, left to its own devices, industry would
make such decisions without adequate regard for the public interest." In
other words, there is a market failure leading to government intervention and
the use of regulation as a corrective check on the market.
Justice Breyer's book is groundbreaking not so much in its approach to
any one regulatory scheme, but rather in its insistence that economic
regulation can be studied as a science and that certain general rules can be
derived which are applicable to all regulatory schemes. In it, he sets forth his
views of the agency decisionmaking process both as it affects regulated
industries (such as telecommunications and transportation) and as it affects
subject areas common to industry in general (such as environmental
protection). In Justice Breyer's view, the decisionmaking process utilized by
administrative agencies has inherent limitations which prevent the agency from
successfully regulating the market.
The structure of the book is quite simple. First, Justice Breyer identifies
those situations where the free market has failed and government regulation
of the marketplace is justified.21 The main situations identified are:
(1) where one firm enjoys a natural monopoly;22 (2) where "economic rents"
are present; (3) where "spillovers" are present;24 (4) where buyers have
Telecommunications and Antitrust, in DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION?
REGTULATORY REFORm IN EUROPE AND TBE UNTrED STATES 20-21 (1990) [hereinafter
Regulation and Deregulation in the United States].
20. See Regulation and Deregulation in the United States, supra note 19, at 7-8.
21. BREYER, supra note 19, at 15-35.
22. For example, where the industry cannot support more than one firm. See
BREYER, supra note 19, at 15.
23. One example is where firms own stockpiles of a commodity, such as oil, that
were purchased at prices far lower than the current market price. See BRYER, supra
note 19, at 21.
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inadequate information to evaluate competing products; and (5) where
"excessive competition" is feared.25 Next, Justice Breyer identifies six main
variations of "classical regulation" that have been used by government
agencies in the past to address these free market failures: (1) cost-of-service
ratemaking;26 (2) historically-based price regulation;- 7 (3) allocation under
a public interest standard;28 (4) standard setting;29 (5) historically-based
allocation;" and (6) individualized screening.31
In Justice Breyer's opinion, each of these above-mentioned forms of
classicalregulation has varying degrees of success and failure in correcting the
market failure at issue, and each has its own inherent inefficiencies as well.
Therefore, Justice Breyer sets forth several "alternatives" which might be used
to address a market failure instead of classical regulation.32  These
alternatives include: (1) reliance on antitrust law to police an unregulated
marketplace; (2) requiring firms to disclose more information about its
products and production methods than it would freely choose to do;
24. A "spillover" occurs when the unregulated price of a good imposes costs on
others who are not involved in its production, as when the environmental effects of a
manufacturer's pollution are not reflected in the product's price. See BREYER, supra
note 19, at 23.
25. "Excessive competition" is a condition that occurs when unregulated firms
in a particular industry consistently price their product too low, thereby putting many
firms out of business and reducing competition as a whole. BREYER, supra note 19,
at 29. The likelihood that such a condition would ever occur in an unregulated
marketplace is open to question. See Roger G. Noll, Handbook for Reform: Breyer
on Regulation, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 1108, 1113 (1983) (characterizing Justice Breyer's
treatment of excessive competition as a "straw man" argument).
26. In cost of service ratemaking, an agency uses estimates of a firm's cost to
set authorized prices. See BREYER, supra note 19, at 36-37.
27. In historically based price regulation, an agency dictates future prices in the
industry on the basis of historical price levels. See BREYER, supra note 19, at 60.
28. An agency engaged in public interest allocation strives to use criteria
reflecting the public interest to choose which among competing claimants will be
allowed to use a scarce resource. See BREYER, supra note 19, at 71.
29. Standard setting requires the agency to mandate certain technical details of
a product or production process. See BREYER, supra note 19, at 96.
30. An agency engaged in historically-based allocation grants rights to users of
a scarce resource on the basis of their historical use. See BREYER, supra note 19, at
120.
31. Individualized screening requires the agency to conduct a case by case review
of producers or products to determine which will be permitted to enter the market or
which will be precluded from entering. See BREYER, supra note 19, at 131.
32. BREYER, supra note 19, at 156-83.
1994]
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(3) taxation designed to transfer income or deter socially undesirable conduct;
and (4) the creation of marketable property rights.33
Justice Breyer's main conclusion from his analysis is that economic
regulation fails when it uses an improper form of classical regulation to
address the particular market failure at hand." He calls this situation a
"mismatch." Rather than rely on old models of classical regulation that have
been used repeatedly in the past, he argues that the government should use
alternatives to regulation to craft responses more closely aligned to specific
types of market failure. Thus, he argues that the cost-of-service ratemaking
used to regulate prices in the transportation industry will inevitably prove
inadequate to address the market failure perceived in that industry namely, a
risk of excessive price competition between firms.35 He suggests that
deregulation, coupled with the enforcement of the antitrust laws where
necessary, is a better method of addressing this problem. Justice Breyer holds
up the deregulation of the airlines as a successful example of this approach.36
Similarly, he argues that standard setting is an inadequate regulatory
response to the economic rents caused by industrial pollution. Standard
setting efforts in the pollution control context might entail an attempt to
dictate the permissible levels of specific industrial waste products. However,
Justice Breyer argues, it is too difficult to reach a scientific consensus on the
safe levels of human exposure to each of the tens of thousands of pollutants
that are currently present in our environment, both singly and in
combination.37 Instead of expending time and effort in a fruitless search for
scientifically accepted standards which would limit each firm to an allowable
amount of pollutants, Justice Breyer advocates the use of an incentive-based
mechanism such as marketable rights to reduce the economic rents caused by
industrial pollution. 8 As might be expected, this view leads him to be
somewhat critical of the past efforts of the Environmental Protection Agency.
One of Justice Breyer's criticisms of classical regulation is that it
typically raises costs in the industry and thus may create a barrier to entry for
new firms.39 Barriers to entry reduce competition and may ultimately raise
prices to consumers. In certain instances, however, this may not be a bad
33. BREYER, supranote 19, at 156-183. A system of marketable property rights
is created by first establishing a limited number of rights to engage in certain conduct
(such as polluting). A market is then allowed to form where these rights are bought
and sold by those who wish to engage in the conduct. BREYER, supra note 19, at 171.
34. BREYER, supra note 19, at 192-96.
35. BREYER, supra note 19, at 197.
36. BREYER, supra note 19, at 197, 220-21.
37. BREYER, supra note 19, at 261-66.
38. B, YER, supra note 19, at 271-84.
39. BREYER, supra note 19, at 194.
[Vol. 59
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result. Classical regulation may be desirable if it operates to prevent firms
from entering the market when they cannot meet the costs imposed by health,
safety, or environmental standards. Justice Breyer himself has recognizedthis
possible limitation on his theory of economic regulation. In another context,
he has suggested that regulation should be judged differently when it is
designed to address health and safety concerns as opposed to when it is
intended solely to correct a market failure.4"
Justice Breyer's analysis of economic regulation is interesting, but
ultimately his detailed exposition of the typical characteristics of classical
regulation is more satisfying than his suggestions concerning the reform of the
regulatory process.4 For instance, Justice Breyer convincingly points to the
airline industry as an example of a regulatory mismatch cured by deregulation,
and suggests that other mismatches might be similarly addressed. However,
Justice Breyer leaves unexplored the possible limits of deregulation as a
regulatory alternative. More recent experiences with deregulation, such as the
deregulation of the Savings & Loan industry (and its subsequent bail-out),
suggest that merely removing an existing regulatory scheme is no guarantee
of a healthy and competitive industry.4" In other writings, Justice Breyer has
indicated that newly deregulated industries may pose special risks to the public
that call for special policies.4" Yet, a close examination of these special risks
and special policies is lacking in Justice Breyer's recommendations for the
reform of the regulatory process.
Justice Breyer also places a great deal of faith in antitrust enforcement as
a vehicle to police the unregulated marketplace. This faith might be misplaced
in instances where the government lacks the will or the resources to pursue
enforcement actions, or where the industry at issue lacks firms capable of
shouldering the costs of private enforcement. In addition, when compared to
classical regulation, private litigation under the antitrust laws contains its own
inefficiencies. Overcrowded dockets lead to delays in final resolutions and an
ensuing uncertainty concerning the rights of the parties. Litigation also leads
to the development of the law through individual holdings as opposed to rules
of general applicability. Finally, unlike the classical regulatory process, the
use of antitrust litigation to police the market leaves open the possibility that
40. See Stephen G. Breyer, The Economics of AIDS, N.Y. TIMEs, March 6, 1994,
§ 7, at 24 (reviewing TOMAS J. PHmIipSON AND RIcHARD'A. POSNER, PRIVATE
CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN EcoNoMIc PERSPECTIVE
(1994)).
41. See generally Noll, supra note 25, at 1117-18.
42. See Lloyd N. Cutler, RegulatoryMismatch and Its Cure, 96 HARv. L. REv.
545 (1982).
43. See Regulation and Deregulation in the United States, supra note 19, at 19.
1994]
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all persons affected by the dispute will not be parties to the action and, thus,
will not be heard.
Another question unsatisfactorilyansweredis how Justice Breyer's reform
is to be implemented. He suggests a congressional review of existing
agencies.44 Whether Congress is institutionally capable of performing the
objective task of re-examining existing regulatory schemes, and then
identifying and correcting regulatory mismatches, is suspect. Political forces
and special interests, as well as an entrenched agency bureaucracy, may
prevent Congress from successfully engaging in such reform efforts."
More importantly for purposes of this essay, Justice Breyer's analysis of
economic regulation makes several basic assumptions that are relevant to his
likely approach to business law issues. First, Justice Breyer approaches
regulatory questions with a general bias towards the free market and against
regulation.46 He recognizes that regulation has certain inherent inefficiencies,
such as the difficulties entailed in agency fact gathering, the resulting agency
dependence on necessarily incomplete and biased information, and an
institutional tendencyby the agency to rely on regulatory schemes that imitate
past regulatory models rather than to create innovative responses to new
problems.47 Justice Breyer also believes that the business decisionmaking
process produces better decisions than the administrative decisionmaking
process when it comes to the content of subjective standards (such as what
constitutes "quality" television programming).4" Given these weaknesses,
attempts at economic regulation by the government may do more harm than
good. Finally, he believes that classical regulation can never be an adequate
response to the problems of excessive competition, control of economic rents
or spillovers.49 As a result, he believes that regulation of an industry is only
justifiable as a last resort and only if the overall public interest is served."0
44. BREYER, supra note 19, at 357-58.
45. See Cutler, supra note 42, at 552.
46. See Regulation and Deregulation in the United States, supra note 19, at 20
('Decentralized individual decisions made in a workably competitive marketplace or
[sic] more likely to prove economically efficient, to bring about efficient production
processes, and to encourage desirable innovation than are the centralized, bureaucratic
decisions of the economic regulator.").
47. See also Noll, supra note 25, at 1118.
48. See BREYER, supra note 19, at 81.
49. BREYER, supra note 19, at 195.
50. See BREYER, supra note 19, at 195; Regulation and Deregulation in the
United States, supra note 19, at 21 (regulation is "to be used only as a weapon of last
resort-as a heroic cure reserved for a serious disease.").
[Vol. 59
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2. Antitrust Doctrine
Justice Breyer's interpretation of substantive antitrust law also reflects his
faith in the self-regulating function of a competitive market. He typically
favors interpretations of the Sherman Act that give its prohibitions a limited
scope of applicability. 1 The result of such an interpretation is a philosophy
of antitrust which maximizes the scope of permitted competitive activity.
One such case is Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co. 2 Critics have
called the decision "anti-consumer."53 In that case, Justice Breyer rejected
a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act that an electric utility had used a
price squeeze to monopolize the local distribution of electricity. A price
squeeze can occur when a company operates at two levels of an industry-it
produces a product which it supplies to customers at a wholesale price, and
at the same time it also sells the product at retail prices to the public in
competition with its own customers. 4 Thus, the company might charge its
customers a higher than fair price at the wholesale level and also undercut its
customers by selling the product to the public at a lower price than its
customers can afford to match at the retail level.
In Town of Concord, Justice Breyer held that no illegal price squeeze was
possible by Boston Edison since the prices at which the utility sold its
electricity were subject to regulatory approval at both levels of the market.55
He emphasized that regulators can control the prices set by Boston Edison
and, therefore, the harms that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent-in
this case, a price squeeze that drives competitors from the market and deters
new competitors from entering-are not likely to occur." Since no
anticompetitive harm is likely, the risks that the utility's pricing practices will
help it maintain a monopoly are outweighed by the tendency of the prices to
51. See, e.g., Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerisohe Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft,
19 F.3d 745 (lst Cir. 1994); Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d
525 (1st Cir. 1989); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New
England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988).
52. 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
53. See Hearings on the BreyerNomination (July 12, 1994) (questioning of Sen.
Metzenbaum). For a generally supportive analysis of Justice Breyer's reasoning, see
Keith A. Rowley, Note, Immunity From Regulatory Price Squeeze Claims: From
Keogh, Parker, and Noerr to Town of Concord and Beyond, 70 Tax. L. REv. 399,
409-10, 416 (1991) (arguing that aggressive enforcement of the antitrust laws to
control price squeezes may "discourage efficient operations and deprive customers of
prices that reflect lower costs .... 1).
54. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 18.
55. Id. at 19, 25-28.
56. Id. at 25.
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reflect efficient operations and by the salutary effect of the utility's low retail
rates on consumers.
Justice Breyer's narrow interpretation of section 2 in this case appears to
be influenced by his belief that antitrust law serves as an alternative to
classical regulation.58 Either antitrust law or classical regulation is a possible
response to a perceived market failure, and either one provides an adequate
remedy. So long as one system is in place, the harm has been addressed and
the other system is unnecessary.59
Justice Breyer has also used a narrow interpretation of antitrust injury to
limit the interference of the antitrust laws with the operation of the
competitive marketplace. Under established doctrine, an antitrust plaintiff may
only recover for harm that flows from anticompetitive conduct." Critics
have charged Justice Breyer with using economic theory as a vehicle to
cleanse defendants of liability for injurious acts, in that the economic model
under which he operates recognizes only a limited range of conduct that is
truly anticompetitive.61 In particular, Justice Breyer equates anticompetitive
conduct with conduct which ultimately leads to higher prices for
consumers.62 Where this harm is unlikely to occur, Justice Breyer finds that
dismissal of the plaintiff's claim is required due to the lack of a cognizable
antitrust injury.
An example of this approach may be seen in Interface Group, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Port Authority.63 Interface purchased two aircraft from TWA
for use in a charter service. Part of the deal was TWA's agreement to allow
Interface to use TWA ground services at Logan Airport's Terminal C.
57. Id. at 26-27.
58. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
59. Other courts considering the same issue have been more accommodating to
antitrust claims against utilities under dual regulation. See, e.g., City of Anaheim v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1992); see also City of
Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1179 (8th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that
a price squeeze may be possible in a regulated industry), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170
(1983); City of Groton v. Connecticut Light and Power Co.,.662 F.2d 921, 934-35 (2d
Cir. 1981) (same); City of Mishawakav. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976,
983-85 (7th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); see generally John
E. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze As An Antitrust Cause of Action, 31
UCLA L. REv. 563, 622-30 (1984) (arguing that, inthe absence of regulatory reform,
the enforcement of the antitrust laws is an acceptable remedy for harmful price
squeezes).
60. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
61. See Page, supra note 14, at 1278-90.
62. See Regulation and Deregulation in the United States, supra note 19, at 28;
Grappone, 858 F.2d at 794 (Breyer, C.J.).
63. 816 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
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Massport, which operates Logan Airport, had a policy requiring all charter
services to utilize Terminal E where they were required to purchase ground
services from Massport's own authorized seller of such services (called fixed
base operators or "FBOs"). Interface sued, claiming that Massport's policy
constituted an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.'
Analyzing the purported agreement in restraint of trade under the rule of
reason,65 Justice Breyer found no antitrust violation. In particular, he
rejected claims that Massport's policy requiring charter services like Interface
to utilize the services of the FBOs at Terminal E constituted an exclusive
dealing arrangement between Massport and the FBOs.66 He noted that
Interface could not show the arrangement between Massport and the FBOs
made it "easier for Massport to abuse its market power or more difficult for
new firms to build competing airports."'6 Therefore, Justice Breyer found
that the arrangement between Massport and the FBOs did not cause the type
of harm that is the subject of section l's prohibition.6"
Critics of the decision have made much of Justice Breyer's supposed
reasoning that Massport's policy did not lead to antitrust harm because other
potential market entrants remained free to build "competing airports"-an
obvious absurdity given the fact that airport authorities like Massport are
64. Id. at 10.
65. The literal language of § 1, declaring every conspiracy in restraint of trade
to be illegal, would criminalize every agreement concerning trade. See Chicago Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Recognizing this fact, the Supreme
Court has long held that the statute only prohibits "unreasonable" restraints of trade.
See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'nv. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma,
468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); Standard Oil Co.v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1911).
A "rule of reason" analysis has developed to allow the court to determine which
practices impose an unreasonable restraint on competition. The classic articulation of
the rule of reason was set forth by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint; and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts.
246 U.S. at 238 (Brandeis, J.).
66. Interface Group, 816 F.2d at 11.
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quasi-public bodies created by the legislature." However, Justice Breyer's
point appears to be that Massport (and its delegate FBOs) were not in
economic competition with the charter business. Therefore, Massport's policy
requiring all charters to purchase ground services through the FBOs was not
designed to keep the charter from competing with Massport. The policy did
not limit competition with Massport, nor did it assist Massport in creating or
maintaining a monopoly.70 This led Justice Breyer to conclude that the
Massport policy may have caused harm to Interstate, but it was not a harm
prohibited by the antitrust laws. By recognizing the harmfulness of the
Massport policy as applied to Interstate, but refusing to find the antitrust laws
applicable because Massport and Interstate were not in direct economic
competition, Justice Breyer adopted a narrow reading of the scope of
section 1.
Other antitrust opinions by Justice Breyer are similar. In Clamp-All
Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute,.1 he rejected a claim that the
defendant's high prices on some products constituted evidence of unlawfully
low prices on others. Justice Breyer stated that the manner in which the
defendant financed a low price was irrelevant unless the plaintiff could first
show that the low price was predatory.72  In Monahan's Marine, Inc. v.
Boston Whaler, Inc.,73 Justice Breyer found that evidence of "sweetheart
deals" between a boat builder and some of its dealers was insufficient to
support an antitrust claim by a dealer who failed to receive similar terms. He
reasoned that, if antitrust laws forced suppliers to cut prices to all competing
dealers or to none at all, suppliers in the builder's position might choose not
to cut prices and consumers would ultimately pay higher prices. 4 In both
of these cases, Justice Breyer considered evidence of conduct that was
injurious to the complaining firm. However, because Justice Breyer found
that the injury was not of the type prohibited by the antitrust laws, he rejected
the significance of the evidence. 5 Once again, his narrow view of what
69. See Charles Mueller, An Antitrust Stumble On the Road to the Supreme
Court: The BreyerCase, 24 ANrrrRUST L. & EcoN. Rnv. 1, 11 (1992-1993) (stating
that Justice Breyer's use of theory without a coherent statement of facts results in an
opinion that "fail[s] to make any sense").
70. See PmLp' E. ARBEDA ET AL., ANTrrRUST LAW 736.2e at 874 (Supp.
1993) (stating that the denial of an essential facility to a consumerwho is not an actual
or potential competitor does not prevent or otherwise limit competition with the owner
of the essential facility).
71. 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989).
72. Id. at 485-86.
73. 866 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1989).
74. Id. at 527-28.
75. See Page, supra note 14, at 1290.
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constitutes an antitrust injury led Justice Breyer to adopt a permissive attitude
towards the allegedly anticompetitive conduct.
B. Rules of Easy Administration
Justice Breyer's approach to business law issues is also conservative in
the sense that he prefers to adopt legal rules of decision that are simple for the
courts to apply. 6 He is conscious of the need for courts to adopt standards
of liability that can be effectively administered by the judiciary, which is more
limited in its fact finding ability than a regulatory agency, and which has less
resources available to it. Such rules have the added benefit of predictability,
which allows lawyers to advise their clients as to the likely consequence of
specific conduct.
Therefore, where an expansive standard of liability is proposed that
would involve a court in determining difficult questions of fact, or would lead
to unpredictable results, Justice Breyer is likely to reject such a standard.
Instead, Justice Breyer prefers to adopt a simpler rule that can be easily
administered even if the simpler rule results in practices that Congress
intended to condemn going unpunished. 7 By eschewing complicated factual
inquires, courts can apply the relevant legal standards quickly and consistently
to determine what conduct violates the congressional statute. However,
leaving the full promise of the congressional legislation unfulfilled is the price
of easy administration.
76. See Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerisohe Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 19
F.3d 745, 751 (lst Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J.) ("Perhaps one could somehow avoid this
anomaly in other ways, but it seems undesirable to invent epicycles in an already too
complex area of the law. It is simpler to hold in parallel fashion that ownership alone
makes a 'single seller' of a fin and its wholly owned distributor .... "); Town of
Concordv. BostonEdison Co., 915 F.2d 17,22 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.) (antitrust
rules "must be administratively workable and therefore cannot always take account of
every complex economic circumstance or qualification"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931
(1991); Barry Wright Corp. v. 1TT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (lst Cir. 1983)
(Breyer, C.J.) ('Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and
qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-
productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.").
77. Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 234 ("[D]espite the theoretical possibility of
finding instances in which horizontal price fixing, or vertical price fixing, are
economically justified, the courts have held them unlawful per se, concluding that the
administrative virtues of simplicity outweigh the occasional 'economic' loss....
Conversely, we must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for
a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate
price competition.") (citations omitted).
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In Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,78 one of his most
influential79 antitrust opinions, Justice Breyer considered whether a firm with
a monopoly on the production of mechanical snubbers violated the antitrust
laws by reducing the price that it charged to its primary purchaser. The
plaintiff, a competing snubber manufacturer, claimed that the price cut was an
action by a monopolist designed to win sales away from a newly emerging
competitor. The key fact was that, even with the price cut, the price charged
by the defendant was still greater than the cost of producing the snubbers. If
the defendant monopolist had lowered its prices below its "incremental
cost"8 in order to drive out a competitor, so that it could subsequently raise
prices without fear of competition, then its conduct would have constituted
predatory pricing and it almost certainly would have been held to be a
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.8
The precise question was whether a price cut above incremental
cost--one that still allowed the monopolist to cover the costs of
production-should be deemed unlawful. Justice Breyer held that it should
not. He stated that lower prices benefit consumers and that one of the
Sherman Act's goals is to provide consumers with the low price levels that are
typically present in a competitive market." He declined to interpret the
Sherman Act as prohibiting a price cut unless it could be shown that the lower
price would hurt consumers. This requirement is arguably met in cases
involving prices below incremental cost, but the plaintiff could not show any
such harm flowing from a price cut that remained above cost. The
consequence of Justice Breyer's reasoning is that a price cut above the firm's
incremental cost can rarely form the basis of a section 2 violation."
78. 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
79. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
594 (1986) (Powell, J.) (citing Barry Wright favorably); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v.
Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, C.J.)
(following Barry Wright), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990); Henry v. Chloride, Inc.,
809 F.2d 1334, 1344-46 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); see also AREDA ET AL., supra note
70, 714.6c, at 715 (favorably describing Justice Breyer's "perceptive" opinion).
80. Incremental costs are usually defined as "the costs that the finn would save
by not producing that additional product it can sell at that price." Barry Wright, 724
F.2d at 232.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). This section prohibits the maintenance of monopoly
power through means beyond the needs of ordinary business dealings.
82. Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 231 ("[A] legal precedent or rule of law that
prevents a fn from unilaterally cutting its prices risk [sic] interference with one of
the Sherman Act's most basic objectives: the low price levels that one would find in
well-functioning competitive markets.").
83. Justice Breyer left open the possibility that § 2 of the Sherman Act might be
violated by a price cut above incremental cost but below average total cost, "a
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The plaintiff responded by arguing that a strict rule allowing all price cuts
above cost was inappropriate and that the plaintiff should be allowed to
recover if it could show a price cut above cost coupled with an intent to harm
a competitor. While recognizing the possibility that a price cut above cost
might sometimes be made with an exclusionary motivation, and that such
conduct is undeserving of protection, Justice Breyer worried that a rule
premising liability on the motives behind the price cut would lead to problems
of proof and might possibly deter other firms from making legitimate price
cuts." Therefore, Justice Breyer rejected the plaintiff's argument and held
that the better rule is to severely limit the instances in which a price cut above
incremental cost can serve as the basis of a Section 2 violation.
85
Justice Breyer's reasoning recognized that the judicial objective in
interpreting the antitrust laws should be to arrive at an interpretation that
prohibits all of the conduct that Congress intended to prohibit in passing the
statutes. However, strict compliance with this objective may lead judges to
adopt rules that are deficient in three ways: (1) they are incapable of easy
application; (2) they lead to unpredictable results; and (3) they discourage
desirable conduct. Faced with this predicament Justice Breyer chose to err
on the side of allowing some odious conduct to escape liability, so that the
maximum amount of lawful competition might be preserved in the
marketplace.86 Accordingly, he chose a legal rule that premised liability on
circumstance that can arise either when production is at a level below full capacity and
the finm lowers prices to levels that do not cover a 'fair share' of fixed costs or when
a plant is pushed beyond its 'full' capacity at prices that do not cover the specially
high costs of the extraordinary production levels." Id. at 233. See generally Jessica
L. Goldstein, Note, Single Firm Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law: The Rose Acre
Recoupment Test and the Search for an Appropriate Judicial Standard, 91 COLUM. L.
Ruv. 1757, 1764 (1991) (noting that prices above average total cost enjoy a "strong
or conclusive presumption of legality").
84. Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 235-36.
85. Id. An alternative would be to adopt a rule placing greater emphasis on the
intent of the finn as a determinant of antitrust liability when it engages in price cuts
above incremental cost. See E.W. French & Sons v. General Portland, Inc., 885 F.2d
1392, 1403-04 (9th Cir. 1989) (Farris, C.J., concurring); Steven Beck, Note, Intent as
an Element of Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 1242, 1259-60 (1991) (noting that Justice Breyer adopts a rule of per se
lawfulness where price exceeds total cost without regard for the intent behind the
pricing decision); see generally Phillip E. Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and
Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 CAL. L. REv. 959, 963 (1987) (arguing
that questions of intent can be misused in monopolization cAses in order to mislead
courts and juries).
86. Ajurist who, unlike Justice Breyer, does not place as much value upon these
particular elements of a legal rule, might well adopt a different approach to statutory
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the issue of whether the price cut was above incremental cost as opposed to
choosing a rule that premised liability on the defendant's subjective intentions
in instituting the price cutY
Justice Breyer's approach is consistent with one identified tendency of the
Chicago school of antitrust jurisprudence: an overriding preference to avoid
the costs of overinclusiveness that flow from the imposition of liability under
per se rules such as those that prohibit tying or predatory pricing." If some
marginal portion of desirable competitive conduct will be deterred by an
overinclusive per se rule, then Justice Breyer will probably examine alternative
legal standards for imposing liability. One alternative in such situations would
be to adopt a fact dependant test of liability. Such tests avoid the risk of
deterring desirable conduct that is inherent in per se rules. However, Justice
Breyer is likely to conclude that fact-based tests are not worth the effort
needed to apply them, given the limited circumstances in which harm to
consumers is likely to occur under his economic models. The only other
alternative available to Justice Breyer is to presume the lawfulness of most
conduct, and to use clear rules of easy applicability to dictate the limited
circumstances in which liability will be imposed.89 This appears to be
Justice Breyer's favored approach.
C. Freedom of Contract
It is difficult to construct an overarching philosophical approach from an
examination of Justice Breyer's opinions dealing with business contracts given
the highly fact-specific nature of contractual disputes. Nonetheless, it appears
that Justice Breyer is most often inclined to hold reasonably sophisticated
parties to the terms of the bargain expressed in their contract.9" Justice
interpretation. For example, compare the language of the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (Blackmun, J.) ("[E]ase of application alone
is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and Congress' policy
decisions.").
87. See also Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEo. L. J. 271, 275
(1987) (discussing use of administrability filters to "screen out" problematic antitrust
cases); cf E. W. French & Sons, 885 F.2d at 1403-04.
88. See Page, supra note 14, at 1265.
89. See Page, supra note 14, at 1266-67 (discussing Justice Breyer's opinion in
Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988)).
90. See, e.g.,Northeast Data Systems, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Computer Sys.
Co., 986 F.2d 607 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that choice of law provision in contract
extended to unfair trade practices claim); Hill Constr. Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc.,
996 F.2d 1315 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding contractual limitation on liability); Allied
Communications Corp. v. Continental Cellular Corp., 821 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1987)
(upholding what the court believed to be the allocation of risk accepted by the parties
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Breyer's approach to business law questions exhibits a healthy respect for the
ability of individuals to contract freely amongst each other in their economic
dealings. Such an approach avoids the paternalism that often results from
judicial efforts to reformulate the terms of a commercial contract. Justice
Breyer appears unlikely to allow a party to avoid its freely made contractual
obligations based on a court's determination that the party consented to an
unfair bargain.
Therefore, Justice Breyer's approach to the enforcement of business
contracts is consistent with his previously discussed reluctance to interfere
with the workings of the competitive marketplace. Justice Breyer apparently
adheres to the view that parties should be free to bargain over allocation of
risk in a commercial contract however they wish, with the knowledge that
courts will strictly enforce such a contractual allocation when disputes arise."
In this way, it is hoped that the law will create predictability and certainty in
business dealings and thereby foster commercial transactions.'
An example of this approach can be seen in VS.I. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc.,' in which Justice Breyer filed a separate opinion. The case involved
an interpretation of Massachusetts' unfair trade practices law.94 The majority
interpreted the law to provide a cause of action for a seller's failure to disclose
known and constructively known defects in a product sold under an "as is"
contract.95 Justice Breyer dissented from this portion of the majority
opinion.
In his dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority for effectively
eliminating the utility of the "as is" contract in a commercial transaction.96
He pointed out that the majority's interpretation forces sellers to search the
product for defects and to disclose every defect that is found.97 Such an
interpretation ignores the fact that some consumers might actually prefer to
accept an "as is" sale, particularly in circumstances where the seller lowers the
price in exchange for the consumer taking on the risk of a hidden defect.98
If that is a bargain that knowledgeable business consumers wish to make, then,
in Justice Breyer's view, the courts should not interpret the unfair trade
in the contract).
91. Some have argued that a single-mindedjudicial protectiveness of the freedom
to contract is a throwback to the Lochner era. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 73-88
(arguing that Chicago School jurists are attempting to "resuscitate Lochner").
92. See Shell, supra note 15, at 505-09.
93. 757 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985).
94. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1984).
95. V.S. Realty, 757 F.2d at 418-19.
96. Id. at 420-21 (Breyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 421.
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practices statute in a way that forces the seller to bear the risk of hidden
defects.99 Instead, he would have interpreted the statute in a manner that
preserved the ability of the buyer and the seller to contract freely with each
other as they saw fit.
D. Access To Federal Forum
In Howe v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd.,"' Justice Breyer upheld the
dismissal of the plaintiff's federal securities law claim on forum non
conveniens grounds, despite a statutory provision' placing exclusive venue
for violations of the federal securities laws in federal court. Justice Breyer's
reasoning in this case is illustrative of a restrictive view of the circumstances
under which plaintiffs should have access to a federal forum in the business
law context. He adopts a conservative approach in that he gives greater
weight to other values-namelythe need to promote harmony among the legal
systems of the world-than he gives to a plaintiff's right to have his claims
heard in federal court.
In Howe, an American shareholder brought his securities lawsuit against
a Canadian company in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, which dismissed the plaintiffs claims on forum non
conveniens grounds."° The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
in an amicus brief, argued that the special venue statute applicable to securities
actions gave the plaintiff the right to have his case heard in the United
States."' Justice Breyer rejected this argument on several grounds.
First, he found no evidence in the legislative history that Congress
intended the venue provision to deprive district courts of their power to
transfer cases to more convenient forums." 4  Second, recent case law
construing special venue statutes in the context of RICO and Jones Act cases
had found no effect on the district court's ability to dismiss the complaint on
forum non conveniens grounds." 5 Finally, Justice Breyer found that the
99. See also G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law
Rules In CommercialCases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1198,
1232-34 (1988) (discussing the majority opinion as an example of liability being
imposedunder a state fair trade practices statute where the omission at issue would not
have led to common law liability).
100. 946 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1172 (1992).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1988).
102. Howe, 946 F.2d at 947.
103. Id. at 948.
104. Id. at 949.
105. Id. at 949-50 (citing Transunion Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc. 811 F.2d 127, 130
(2d Cir. 1987). However, Justice Breyer also recognized contrary precedent holding
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increase in international commerce and the prospect of international forum
shopping provided strong policy grounds for rejecting the SEC
interpretation." 6 Applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens to the
case, Justice Breyer held that, given the superior access to sources of proof in
Canada and the "somewhat similar protections" available under Canadian law,
the district court did not err in dismissing the claim and requiring the plaintiff
to seek relief in the Canadian courts." 7
Justice Breyer recognized that the Canadian company had upwards of
2,500 American shareholders." 8 Given this fact, and given the broad
protections that Congress intended to grant American investors under the
securities laws, it would not have been particularly surprising had Justice
Breyer adopted the SEC argument and held dismissal improper. Certainly, the
prior precedent concerning the availability of forum non conveniens in both
the securities context and the context of similar federal statutes was
mixed." 9
Justice Breyer's failure to adopt the SEC position ultimately rests on
policy grounds. Much of his reasoning is based on the supposed disharmony
among nations that would be engendered by a rule prohibiting dismissal."0
Yet, Justice Breyer's opinion is notable in that its discussion of forum non
conveniens does not address the related issue of the extraterritorial application
of the U.S. securities laws. Some commentators discussing the extraterritorial
application of the U.S. securities laws have suggested that past efforts to apply
the law to activities outside of our borders have actually provoked little outcry
from other nations. Such foreign acquiescence may be due to the general
acceptance among nations of the idea that deceit in securities transactions is
offensive conduct that requires regulation.'' Given this prior experience
with the extraterritorial application of the securities laws, one has to wonder
similar special venue statutes, such as the antitrust special venue provision, to be a bar
to dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 950 (citing Industrial Inv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 890-91 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007
(1983)); cf. Dailey v. NHL, 780 F. Supp. 262, 271-73 (D.N.J. 1991) (declining to
dismiss ERISA claim on forum non conveniens grounds due to exclusive jurisdiction
for such claims in federal court), rev'd, 987 F.2d 172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 67 (1993).
106. Howe, 946 F.2d at 950.
107. Id. at 951-52.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 949-50.
110. Id. at 953 ("[W]e believe that a holding barring transfer would increase the
risk that national legal systems will work to frustrate one another and would hinder
efforts to promote greater coordination and harmony among them.").
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whether the feared disharmony underlying Justice Breyer's opinion is truly
likely to occur. His opinion places greater weight on speculative conflicts
between nations than on the ability of an aggrieved plaintiff to be heard in
federal court.'
112. See also Aliens Mfg. Co. v. Napco, Inc., 3 F.3d 502 (lst Cir. 1993) (breach
of contract claim dismissed for failure to satisfy jurisdictional amount).
Justice Breyer's prior interpretation of the scope of private rights of action under
the securities laws has been mixed. In Jackvony v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411
(lst Cir. 1989), JusticeBreyer affirmed the dismissalof the plaintiff's claim of security
fraud under § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5. Jackvony,
873 F.2d at 413. The plaintiff alleged that he had been defrauded by a bank's failure
to disclose the possibility of its acquisition by another corporation during the time
period when it was offering its securities for sale to the plaintiff. Id. at 413-14.
Justice Breyer concluded that the nondisclosed information concerning the possible
acquisition of the defendant was not material. Id. at 415.
First, the "probability versus magnitude" test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), was not satisfied. Jackvony, 873 F.2d
at 415. The lack of any concrete offers to acquire or specific discussionswithpossible
acquirors during this period evidenced a very low probability that the possible
acquisition would occur. Id. Justice Breyer's conclusion on this point appears to be
a sound one. While Basic has been described as favoring the disclosure of borderline
cases of preliminary negotiation, see THOMAS L. HAZEN, T LAW oF SEcURITIEs
REGULATION § 13.5 at 693 (2d ed. 1990), exploratory contacts that occur prior to the
beginning of negotiations may not make an eventual acquisition probable enough to
merit disclosure, see id. at n.28. In addition, Justice Breyer's opinion concluded that
the possibility of banks such as the defendant corporation being acquired was "general
knowledge" given the expansion of banking that was underway in the early 1980's.
Jackvony, 873 F.2d at 415. Therefore, the disclosure of the specific information at
issue here-the defendant bank's knowledge that it was a potential acquisition
target-would have added nothing significant to the total mix of information already
available to the plaintiff. Id. This reasoning appears to be an application of a form
of the "truth on the market" doctrine. Cf Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892
F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989).
Justice Breyer ruled in a way favorable to a plaintiff's ability to bring a private
lawsuit under the securities laws in In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29
(lst Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072 (1987). In that case, Justice Breyer
considered whether § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which creates
vicarious liability for a securities violation for persons or entities that "control" the
actual offender, was the exclusive theory under which an employer could be found
vicariously liable for the actions of their employee. In re Atlantic, 784 F.2d at 30.
Justice Breyer began by noting that, in the absence of § 20(a), there would be "little
doubt that . . . we should read the Securities Act of 1934 as imposing vicarious
liability .... ." Id. at 32. Then Justice Breyer turned to the effect, if any, that § 20(a)
had on that conclusion. Acknowledging a split in the circuits on the issue, Justice
Breyer sidedwitlithe majority view and held that, despite the existence of § 20(a), that
[Vol. 59
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E. Use of Economic Theory
Jurists who adhere to the Chicago school of law and economics are often
identified as proponents of a conservative judicial philosophy. Among the
ideas advanced by the Chicago school is the idea that economic efficiency,
often defined in terms of wealth maximization, should be the principal
criterion for judging the desirability of legal rules.' In this view, legal
rules that promote economic efficiency are preferable to rules that do not
sectionwas not exclusive and a plaintiff could still bring a claim against the employer
under traditional common law theories of vicarious liability. Id. at 34-35.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court recently decided Central Bankv. First Interstate
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). In the CentralBank case, the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs bringing a private actionunder Rule lOb-5 may not recover under a common
law theory of aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 1455. This holding was contrary to
every circuit court opinion to consider the issue of whether aiding and abetting liability
was available under Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
857 F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Aiding and abetting is itself a violation of Section
10(b) and Rule l0b-5."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1002 (1989); Congregation of the
Passionv. Kidder Peabody & Co., 800 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1986). The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, reasoned that the text of § 10(b) limited the
scope of conduct under which liability could be imposed by the judiciary in an implied
private right of action. Central Bank, 114 S.Ct. at 1446-48. Since the language of
§ 10(b) does not mention aiding and abetting liability, courts may not extend liability
under that section to reach those who aid and abet a primary wrongdoer. Id. at 1440.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Central Bank appears to signal the future
demise of vicarious liability in private actions brought under Rule lob-5. As is the
case with aiding and abetting conduct, conduct which gives rise to liability under
various common law doctrines of vicarious liability is nowhere mentioned in the text
of § 10(b). Thus, courts may not extend the reach of Rule lOb-5 to impose liability
for such conduct. The existence of an express provision for control person liability,
under § 20(a) of the statute, adds weight to this argument.
Thus, Justice Breyer may have an opportunity to revisit the issue in In Re
Atlantic Fin. Management if, as is likely, the Supreme Court is asked to determine the
implications of its Central Bank holding for the doctrine of vicarious liability under
the securities laws. It will be interesting to observe whether, in such a situation,
Justice Breyer stands by the reasoning in his prior opinion. Justice Breyer's view is
unlikely to be determinative, however. The jurist he replaces on the Supreme Court,
Justice Blackmun, dissented from the holding in CentralBank.
113. RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNOMIc ANALYsIs OF LAw 23 (1992); see ROBIN
MALOY, LAW AND EcONOMIcs: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH THEORY AND
PRACTICE 60-66 (1990) (describing the relatively conservative approach taken by the
Chicago School as opposed to other law and economics theorists); George L. Priest,
The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Clark and Posner, 90 YALE
L.J. 1284, 1287-88 (1981) (discussing the concept of economic efficiency as a
"scientific proposition").
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produce such a result.' Justice Breyer might be characterized as a
conservative jurist because he is a student of economics and often uses
economic analogies in his opinions.
In his writings, Justice Breyer has stressed the usefulness of both
economic theory and analogies based on economic principles as tools to help
judges and regulators. 5 In his view, these tools provide a framework
which places legal arguments in perspective and which helps decisionmakers
to focus on the known or unknown facts most reievant to the decision at
hand." 6  Justice Breyer's judicial opinions reflect this philosophy. For
example, in Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke
Aktiengesellschaft,"7 Justice Breyer addressed the issue of whether a firm
and its subsidiary should be treated as a single seller under the Robinson-
Patman Act"8 by using an economic diagram to represent the distribution
arrangement between a hypothetical manufacturer, its wholly owned.
distributor, and various types of retailers." 9 Similarly, a lengthy appendix
to Justice Breyer's opinion in the Town of Concord case included graphic and
numerical examples which Justice Breyer used to "help provide an intuitive
understanding of the possible price effect of having two separate monopolists
at two different industry levels.' ' 20 In addition to charts and diagrams,
Justice Breyer's opinions, most notably in the area of antitrust, often contain
extended explanations of the economic principles that he believes underlie the
legal rules relevant to the case.'
2
'
However, while Justice Breyer unabashedly uses economic theory to
inform his view of the law, he does not reduce all legal controversies to the
114. PoSNER, supra note 113, at 23. Professor Minda has argued that Judge
Posner, in his most recent writings, has moderated his prior assertion that the
economically efficient rule is necessarilythe correct rule, in favor of a more pragmatic
approach. See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. OF LEGAL EDUC.
27,37-38 (1993) (discussing RICHARD A. PosmR, THE PROBLEMS OF JURSPRUDENmCE
(1990)).
115. See Stephen G. Breyer, Economists and Economic Regulation, 47 U. PrT.
L. REv. 205, 217-18 (1985).
116. See Breyer, supra note 115.
117. 19 F.3d 745 (1st Cir. 1994).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1973).
119. Caribe, 19 F.3d at 749.
120. 915 F.2d at 32-33. See also Hearings on the BreyerNomi'nation (July 12,
1994) (questioning by Sen. Metzenbaum) ("[M]y question is, in view of the jury
verdict, the court's verdict, the position that the city of Concord and the people of that
community were in, why did you disregard all of those facts and replace them with a
graph and a chart that are completely hypothetical?").
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question of which proposed legal rule produces the efficient result. In other
words, he is willing to use economic theory to help explain why the law
should adopt a particular result as opposed to other alternatives, but he differs
from the Chicago school of jurists in that he does not proclaim that economic
theory is the law. 2
Justice Breyer freely admits the limitations of economic theory as an aid
to legal decisionmaking. He recognizes that economists often disagree on
specific points and that economic theory cannot anticipate and encompass
every complex fact pattern that might end up in court.1" He does, however,
find economics to be a useful tool in an area of the law like antitrust, where
the congressional statute uses vague language and where economic theory
provides clear and workable standards that judges can apply in a way
consistent with legislative purposes."'
His fondness for economic analogies and his faith in the unbridled
workings of the competitive marketplace can lead Justice Breyer to adopt
positions that might be criticized as insufficiently cognizant of their human
impact." For example, Justice Breyer has argued that we should rethink
the manner in which we assess and regulate health risks given the large cost
involved in eliminating risk completely and the small incremental benefit in
reducing risk beyond a certain point."6 As an academic exercise, this is
certainly a question that every society should consider. However, some people
feel strongly that even minimal amounts of certain health risks-say cancer
risks from pollution-are unacceptable. These people will undoubtedly be
concerned that a Justice of the Supreme Court, with the great power that that
institution possesses, is even willing to pose such a question. Nonetheless,
Justice Breyer is not insensitive to such concerns. He has written that
"economics alone cannot prescribe how much society should spend on health
and safety."'2
7
122. See Judicial Precedent and the New Economics, in ANTrrRUST FORUM
1983-ANrRUST POLICY IN TRANsrmoN: TuE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND
ECoNOMICs 9, 16 (Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson eds. 1983) [hereinafter
Judicial Precedent and the New Economics].
123. Id. at 17, 19-20; see Breyer, supra note 115, at 207-11.
124. Judicial Precedent and the New Economics, supra note 122, at 9-11.
125. See Hearings on the BreyerNomination (July 12, 1994) (questioning of Sen.
Metzenbaum) (suggestingthattheories of economic efficiency replace individualjustice
in Justice Breyer's antitrust opinions).
126. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING TIm Vicious CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993); STEPBEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND rrs
REFORM 150 (1982).
127. See Stephen G. Breyer, The Economics of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, March 6,
1994, § 7, at 24.
1994]
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F Deference to Agency Decisionmaking
Federal agencies regulate business through direct economic regulation of
a particular industry or through health, safety, and environmental regulations
applicable to all businesses. As a member of the Supreme Court, Justice
Breyer will be called upon to review agency decisions-especially decisions
involving an agency interpretation of the congressional statute which dictates
the bounds of agency authority. Justice Breyer's opinions in this area while
a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit represent a bit of
a departure from the other opinions discussed in this essay. In fact, it is in
this area of his judicial philosophy in which Justice Breyer comes closest to
adopting the position most often associated with a more liberal judicial
philosophy. A liberal approach toward the question of judicial review of
agency decisionmaking is most evident in Justice Breyer's immigration law
opinions.
In contrast to his sometimes impersonal reasoning in the areas of
economic regulation and antitrust, Justice Breyer's immigration opinions
demonstrate a real concern for the human consequences of his rulings. For
example, in Thomas v. INS,2' Justice Breyer dissented from a majority
opinion upholding a deportation order issued in absentia when the alien was
30 minutes late for a hearing. Justice Breyer's dissent noted that deportation
is a "very severe, very stringent consequence."" 9 He would have held that
the Board of Immigration Appeals acted arbitrarily in refusing to reopen the
alien's case under these facts."' Similarly, in Garavito v. INS, Justice
Breyer held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") abused
its discretion in refusing to approve the alien's request for a visa
reclassification. Under the circumstances presented, Justice Breyer felt that
approval of the alien's request was the more "humane" course of action
available to the INS.'
128. 976 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1992).
129. Id. at 791.
130. Id.
131. 901 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1990).
132. Id. at 177. See also Luna v. INS, 709 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1983) (Board of
Immigration Appeals abused its discretion in refusing alien's request to reopen his
deportation proceedings; alien was entitled to a hearing on his claim that deportation
would result in extreme hardship to his wife and family, who were lawful U.S.
residents). Justice Breyer's appreciation for the human effect of INS decisionmaking
may be due to the fact that his wife is an immigrant, as were his maternal
grandparents. See Hearings on the Breyer Nomination (July 12, 1994) (opening
statement of Justice Breyer).
[Vol. 59
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/2
BUSINESS LAW AND JUSTICE BREYER
In addition to stressing the human side of agency action in immigration
cases, Justice Breyer has also adopted the liberal position on the proper scope
of judicial deference to Executive Branch decisions in the area of immigration
law. In immigration cases, the federal government often argues for, and
conservative jurists often accord, a greater than usual amount of deference to
the decisions of the INS.133 The asserted justification for this extraordinary
deference is the political and national security implications of decisions
affecting immigration. In its most extreme form, the argument that the
Executive Branch possesses "plenary power" over immigration matters would
only allow a reviewing court to set aside an immigration decision that
Congress delegated to the discretionary power of the Attorney General (or to
her delegate within the INS) in very unusual circumstances. 34
Justice Breyer, however, does not accord the government's immigration
decisions any special status. Instead, he treats these decisions as he would
treat any other determination that Congress has placed within an agency's
discretion: he applies ordinary principles of administrative law.135 As a
result, Justice Breyer reverses the decisions of the INS and the Board of
Immigration Appeals more often than is the norm in this area13 (or, at least,
133. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444 (1987) (considering
argument by the Board of Immigration Appeals that its construction of the 1980
Refugee Act was entitled to "substantial deference"); Kevin R. Johnson, Responding
to the "iitigation Explosion:' The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy over
Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 443-44, 460 n.219 (1993) (discussing judicial
deference to executive branch immigration decisions both prior to and after Chevron).
134. See, e.g., Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621,623-24 (1st Cir. 1985)
(Breyer, C.J.) ("The INS points to a number of cases suggesting that the scope of the
government's discretionary power inthis area [immigration] isunusuallybroad-to the
point where a reviewing court would set aside a decision of the sort here at issue only
in very unusual circumstances."); see generally iiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545, 550-60, 580-83 (1990) (explaining the historical
role that the "plenary power doctrine" has played in constitutional immigration law).
135. SeeAnaneh-Firempong,766 F.2d at 624 ("[l]f the INS means that the cases
it cites reach beyond ordinary principles of administrative law to require a special
judicial mood of extraordinary caution in all immigration cases, we do not agree.").
136. See Goncalves v. INS, 6 F.3d 830 (1st Cir. 1993); Da Conceicao Rodrigues
v. INS, 994 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1993); Thomas v. INS, 976 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1992)
(Breyer, C.J., dissenting); Garavito v. INS, 901 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1990); Ananeh-
Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985); Luna v. INS, 709 F.2d 126 (1st Cir.
1983); see also Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994) (Justice Breyer
participating in oral argument and the drafting of the opinion but not in the issuance
of the panel's decision); but see Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1992); Novoa-
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more often than is the norm outside of the 9th Circuit, which has a reputation
for being pro-alien in immigration cases).
Justice Breyer's reading of the general administrative law principles
applicable to federal court review of agency decisionmaking might also be
viewed as somewhat liberal. Under the Supreme Court precedent of Chevron
U.S.A. v. NRDC,'37 a federal court called upon to review an agency's
interpretation of the terms of its governing statute should give that
interpretation considerable deference so long as the statute is not clearly to the
contrary.3 Some conservative jurists have interpreted the Chevron decision
as a command to the lower courts not to second guess agency
interpretations. 39 Unlike these jurists, in the immigration area at least,
Justice Breyer has not hesitated to reject the INS' interpretation of its
governing statute by finding the interpretation "arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion.'
40
137. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
138. The Chevron court adopted a two part test for federal court review of
agency decisionmaking. First, the reviewing court must askwhether Congress directly
addressed the precise question at issue. If the answer is "yes," then the plain meaning
of the statutory language must be enforced. If the answer is "no," then the reviewing
court must accept the agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged with
enforcing-so long as that interpretation is reasonable and a permissible construction.
Id. at 842-43.
139. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of
Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 512, 516-18 (stating belief that Chevron applies with full
force when controversy involves a pure question of statutory interpretation).
Some commentators have suggested that, under the current political climate, a
conservative jurist might be tempted to second guess an activist agency wielding a
heavy regulatory hand, thereby striking down agency action that the judge finds
politically offensive. See Slobodin, supra note 3, at C6. Similarly, BERNARD H.
SiEGAN, in ECONOMIC LiBERTms AND THE CoNsrTmoN 284 (1980), takes the
position that liberal judges critical of laissezfaire economic theory are more likely to
defer to agency regulatory action than conservative judges. This essay, however,
adopts the view that judicial deference to agency decisionmaking is more properly
classified as a conservative attribute, consistentwith other conservative principles such
as judicial restraint and a protective attitude towards the authority of the Executive
Branch.
140. See Goncalves, 6 F.3d at 833 ("[Tjhe Board, while claiming that its
exception is a reasonable 'interpretation' of its regulation, reached that interpretation
by following a complicated logical syllogism that, in our view, is either irrelevant or
erroneous."); Da Conceicao Rodrigues, 994 F.2d at 33-34 (rejecting the Board of
Immigration Appeals' interpretation of the phrase "sentences to confinement actually
imposed" from 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B) (1988)); Thomas, 976 F.2d at 791 (Breyer,
C.J., dissenting) (finding action by Board of Immigration Appeals to be arbitrary);
Garavito 901 F.2d at 174 ("While we recognize that the INS has broad discretionary
[Vol. 59
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The proper degree of judicial deference required by Chevron, especially
in the immigration context, remains the subject of much debate. At least two
of the appellate panels on which Justice Breyer reviewed challenges to INS
decisions have split on the issue.' While it may be overstating matters to
label Justice Breyer a "critic" of the Chevron rule,'42 his past opinions have
taken a liberal view of a federal court's role in overseeing the decisions of the
INS, with the result that he has not hesitated to second guess that agency.
G. Justice Breyer's Place on the Conservative Spectrum
On questions of business law, Justice Breyer has typically taken a
conservative approach towards judging. He has interpreted the law in a
manner that is skeptical of regulatory restrictions on corporate activity and
which allows firms a great degree of freedom in their competitive conduct.
He values legal rules which are capable of easy judicial administration, even
where adoption of those rules may sometimes allow conduct targeted by the
legislature for sanction to go unpunished. His decisions are supportive of the
ability of individuals to contract freely with each other and to allocate the
risks of a transaction in the manner in which they see fit, with little second
guessing by the judiciary. His approach to the question of access to a federal
forum has at times included reasoning that takes a restrictive view towards the
ability of aggrieved parties to have their claim heard in federal court. Justice
Breyer has used economic theory to shield efficient corporate activity from the
reach of legal rules, although he often does so with a recognition of the
limitations of economic theory as a judicial tool. The one area where Justice
Breyer might be expected to part from the conservative approach concerns the
question of deference to agency decisionmaking. Here, Justice Breyer's past
opinions suggest that he will be less inclined to defer to the decisions of an
administrative agency than his conservative colleagues.
authority to decide when, or whether, a change in visa classification is proper.., we
believe that, in this instance, its determination is indeed an 'abuse of discretion.");
Ananeh-Firempong 766 F.2d at 626-29; Luna, 709 F.2d at 127-29.
141. See Ananeh-Firempong, 766 F.2d at 629 (Campell, C.J., dissenting);
Thomas, 976 F.2d at 790-91 (Breyer, C.J., dissenting).
142. See Stephen G. Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 373-81 (1986) (arguing against "strict interpretation" of
Chevron); cf. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHNKING
JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF BUrEAUCRACY 144-47 (1990) (arguing that courts should
engage in a more rigorous review of agency decisionmaking); see also Ernest
Gellhorn, A Justice BreyerMay Tip the Court's Balance, NAT'L. L. J., July 4, 1994,
at A20 (describing Justice Breyer's "distinctive" position on the question of deference
to agency interpretations).
29
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While Justice Breyer has adopted a conservative judicial philosophy in
the above areas, one should not conclude that he will invariably find himself
in agreement with the rest of the conservative wing of the Supreme Court on
business law issues. There are degrees of conservatism, just as there are
degrees of liberalism. The distinctions that exist within the spectrum of a
conservative judicial philosophy are illustrated by the public debates that have
taken place between Justice Breyer and both Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge
Robert Bork-two of the most forceful conservative personalities to have
served on the bench in recent years.143 These debates do not negate the
existence of a large degree of common ground between Justice Breyer and his
conservative brethren. Rather, in each case the source of the disagreement
between Justice Breyer and his fellow jurist was Justice Breyer's reluctance
to accept some of the more extreme manifestations of the conservative
approach.
For example, in the antitrust area, Justice Breyer and Judge Bork have
both been identified with the conservative trend in antitrust law that developed
during the 1980s."' Both jurists are in accord as to the general purposes of
the antitrust laws. They both are proponents of the view that the antitrust
143. In 1991, Justice Breyer participated in a well known debate with Justice
Scalia on the proper judicial use of legislative history. See Verbatim: Judge Stephen
G. Breyer, In His Own Words, LEGAL TIMEs, May 16, 1994 at 12-13; see also Stephen
G. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
RBv. 845, 851-53 (1992); Hearings on the Breyer Nomination (July 12, 1994)
(questioning of Sen. Grassley). Justice Breyer has also taken issue with some of Judge
Bork's views concerning the uses of economic theory in determining substantive
antitrust law. See JudicialPrecedent and the New Economics, supra note 122, at 5-21.
144. Justice Breyer's conservatismin the area of substantive antitrust doctrine is
documented in Kovacic, supra note 8, at 95-96; see also supra, notes 52-76 and
accompanying text.
Justice Breyer's tenure on the First Circuit largely coincided with a series of
antitrust decisions by the Supreme Court that many view as embodying a shift to a
more conservative antitrust jurisprudence. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
WilliamsonTobacco Corp., 113 S.Ct. 2578 (1993); Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 113
S.Ct. 884 (1993); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990);
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Cargill, Inc. v.
Montfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 433
U.S. 36 (1977). It would not be surprising if the decisions of an appellate judge
reflected the growing influence of this trend. However, in the case of Justice Breyer,
the opposite occurred. Many of his appellate decisions influenced the Supreme Court
inways that actually encouraged that Court's shift towards more conservative antitrust
principles. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 594.
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laws are designed to benefit consumers through the lower prices engendered
through competition, and not to protect individual firms from business
risks. 45 In the words of Justice Breyer, "Antitrust law aims through the
competitive process at bringing about low prices for consumers, better
products, and more efficient methods of production. Those three things, in
my mind, are the key to antitrust law and really a strong justification for an
economy in which there are winners and losers, and some people get rich and
others don't."14
The proposition that the effect of challenged conduct on injured firms is
secondary to the possible benefits that such conduct may hold for consumers
underlies many antitrust decisions of the last fifteen years which have
increasingly limited the scope of antitrust liability. Such decisions are
permissive of corporate activity that might have been condemned in prior
years. The criticism of this conservative view of the purpose of antitrust law
is that it ignores the interests of entrepreneurs and engenders a permissive
climate where large, established firms feel free to take harsh actions against
emerging competitors. 47 Advocates of a more expansive view of antitrust
liability argue that the conservative approach ignores the need to preserve
fairness in business tactics and the need to ensure that emerging companies are
given an equal opportunity to succeed."' They charge that the conservative
view can be reduced to four words: big business always wins.4
The antitrust debate between Justice Breyer and Judge Bork did not
center around Justice Breyer's rejection of consumer welfare as the primary
object of the antitrust laws, in favor of an approach that is more protective of
emerging competitors. Instead, Justice Breyer rejected certain extreme aspects
of the conservative approach to antitrust law, as articulated by Judge Bork and
others, that conflicted with two additional principles that inform Justice
Breyer's judicial philosophy. These principles are a respect for legislative
intent and a due regard for precedent.
145. See ROBERT H. BoRgK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADOX 84 (1978); Regulation and
Deregulation in the United States, supra note 19, at 28. This view is sometimes
expressed in the shorthand phrase that the antitrust laws are designed to protect
competition and not competitors.
146. Hearings on the Breyer Nomination (July 12, 1994) (questioning by Sen.
Thurmond).
147. See Hearings on the Breyer Nomination (July 12, 1994) (questioning by
Sen. Metzenbaum).
148. See Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Antitrust: What FairnessMeans and
Why it Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 283 (1994) (arguing that a purely economic
approach to antitrust law discourages entrepreneurial activity by failing to preserve
fairness and by increasing risk in business endeavors).
149. See Mueller, supra note 69, at 7.
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Justice Breyer possesses an obvious respect for Congress and he has
expressed a desire to reach decisions that are compatible with, and in
furtherance of, legislative intentions. 50 Whenever possible, he prefers to
adopt an interpretation of the statute in question that can be reconciled with
evidence of the intent of Congress, even if the competitive marketplace suffers
as a result.' In this way, his approach differs from that of Judge Bork,
who sometimes suggested that courts should decline to enforce congressional
legislation that is unsound as a matter of economic theory."' 2
During his confirmation hearings, Justice Breyer was asked whether he
would interpret the antitrust laws in a manner consistent with the intent of
Congress. Senator Kohl, in the course of questioning the nominee, read a
quote attributed to Judge Posner: "If the legislature enacts into statutory law
a common law concept as Congress did in the Sherman Act, that is a clue that
the courts are to interpret the statute with the freedom with which they
interpret a common law principle, in which event the values of the framers
150. See Hearings on the Breyer Nomination (July 12, 1994) (questioning by
Sen. Biden). Justice Breyer testified that his approach to the interpretation of
environmental regulations "reflects the need for courts to go back to the underlying
intent of Congress." Id. (questioning by Sen. Kennedy). He was also asked by
Senator Thurmond to give his view on congressional attempts to overturn a Supreme
Court decision rejecting the use of statistics to establish racial discrimination in the
imposition of the death penalty. Justice Breyer indicated his willingness to defer to
Congress' decision in the matter, saying "as Congress decides it, so should the courts
enforce it." Id. (questioning by Sen. Thurmond). Most likely Justice Breyer's
favorable view of legislators and the legislative process comes from his experience as
a member of Senator Kennedy's staff. Senator Kennedy has characterized Justice
Breyer as "one of the leading exponents of the view that laws should be construed in
the manner that Congress intended." See id. (opening statement of Sen. Kennedy).
151. See Judicial Precedent and the New Economics, supra note 122, at 13-14
("There is an important difference between working with ambiguities in a statute and
in the case law toward a result that makes good sense in terms of sensible human
purposes-that is what judges do every day-and interpreting a statute completely
contrary to what-on the basis of evidence-Congress meant."). Of course, critics of
Justice Breyer's antitrust opinions would counter that he misreads the intent of
Congress in that area to the extent that he places primacy on the preservation of low
prices for consumers.
152. See Judicial Precedent and the New Economics, supra note 122, at 13.
During the confirmation battle over the nomination of Judge Bork to serve on the
Supreme Court, the greatest concern expressed by members of the Senate regarding
Judge Bork's antitrustviews was that he seemedto have little respect for congressional
legislation inthe area and that his lack of respect raised doubts as to whether he would
faithfully enforce antitrust legislation as a Supreme Court Justice. See 133 CONG. REC.
S14,767 (daily ed. Oct. 22; 1987) (statement of Sen. Biden).
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may not be controlling at all."'5  Senator Kohl contrasted Judge Posner's
position with a quote from Justice Souter, made during Justice Souter's own
confirmation hearings: "When we are dealing with the antitrust laws, we are
dealing with one of the most spectacular delegations to the judiciary that our
legal system knows. Certainly a respect for legislative intent has got to be our
anchor for interpretation." '54 Asked by Senator Kohl to adopt one of the
two positions expressed by these jurists, Justice Breyer expressed his
agreement with Justice Souter on the need to conform antitrust interpretations
with legislative intent.155
Justice Breyer's overall tendency to interpret the Sherman Act so as to
give it a limited scope of applicability5 . is also tempered by a respect for
precedent and an attempt to limit his holdings to the specific facts involved
whenever possible.'57 In this regard as well, it can be argued that he differs
from those who advocate the conservative approach to antitrust in its most
extreme form. For example, Judge Bork has stated that "precedent is less
important in Sherman Act jurisprudence than elsewhere; and this is just as
well. There is no particular reason why courts have to keep doing harm,
rather than good, once they understand economic reality."' 58 In contrast,
153. Hearings on the Breyer Nomination (July 13, 1994) (questioning by Sen.
Kohl).
154. Id.
155. Id.; see also Judicial Precedent and the New Economics, supra note 122,
at 12-13 (disagreeing with Judge Robert Bork, who had taken a position similar to that
expressed in the quotation by Judge Posner, supra note 153).
156. See supra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Town of Concordv. BostonEdison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 29 (1st Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991) (limiting holding somewhat); see also
Hearings on the Breyer Nomination (July 12, 1994) (questioning by Sen. Hatch)
(Justice Breyer expressing an intention to be bound by precedent while serving on the
Court and to avoid deciding cases in a way that expresses a subjective belief or
preference).
158. Judicial Precedent and the New Economics, supra note 122, at 8. Judge
Bork's rather cavalier approach to precedent in the antitrust area was used by critics
of his nomination to the Supreme Court to characterize Judge Bork as an "activist"
judge who exhibited a willingness to declare the law in accordance with his own
ideological views despite legal precedent to the contrary. See SEN. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPRE M COURT, ExEc. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (Oct. 13, 1987) reprinted in 14E HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL
AND UNsuccEssFUL NOMINATIONs OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMrrRE= 1916-1987, at 6693, 6771-6776 (1990). Although Justice
Breyer is generally regarded to hold conservative views on the scope of antitrust law,
no similar charges of activism emerged during his confirmation hearings. An example
of the type of reasoning characterized as "activist" by critics of Judge Bork may be
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Justice Breyer has noted that economic arguments concerning the content of
the antitrust laws should exhibit "sensitivity" towards legal precedent.'
Another way in which Justice Breyer differs from some of his
conservative colleagues is his reluctance to apply economic principles to
illustrative.
One casewhere critics charged Judge Borkwith reaching outto declare principles
of antitrust law beyond the extent warranted by the facts, and with a disregard for
relevant precedent, was Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). In Rothery, a group of local
moving companies that were also agents affiliated with the national firm Atlas Van
Lines sued Atlas over its policy of dropping any agent that directly competed with
Atlas. The agents claimed that the Atlas policy constituted a "boycott" and was
therefore a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 211. Judge Bork
dismissed the claims.
First, he held that not all refusals to deal constitute a "boycott," and that therefore
the Atlas policy should be judged under a balancing test to determine whether it
violated the rule of reason rather than treated as a per se violation of § 1. Id. at
215-16. Second, he suggested that the failure of the defendant Atlas to possess
significant market power was, in and of itself, sufficient to lead to the conclusion that
the policy satisfied the rule of reason. Therefore, no other factors needed to be
considered in performing the balancing test. Id. at 217-21. As pointed out by Judge
Wald in a separate concurrence, the facts of the case would have supported dismissal
on the basis that the weighing of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of the
policy led to the conclusion that the policy did not unreasonably restrict competition.
There was therefore no need for Judge Bork to hold that a defendant's lack of market
power was the determinative factor in the analysis. Id. at 230-32 (Wald, C.J.,
concurring); see also Curtis J. Polk, Should Market Power Be A Surrogate for
Balancing in Applying the Rule of Reason?, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 764 (1987).
Finally, Judge Bork's opinion went on to hold that Atlas' policy was intended to
eliminate the problem of "free riders"- agents who received the benefits of their
association with Atlas while also acting as competitors. Therefore, the policy was
designed to make Atlas more efficient and any anticompetitie effect ancillary to this
proper purpose could not form the basis of an antitrust violation. Atlas Van Lines, 792
F.2d at 224. Judge Bork's authority for this last proposition was a Sixth Circuit
opinion written in the 19th century by Judge William Howard Taft. Id. (citing U.S.
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211
(1899)). A more contemporary Supreme Court opinion appeared to the contrary, see
United States v. Topeo Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), however Judge Bork
interpreted another line of Supreme Court precedent and concluded that Topco had
been "effectively overruled." Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d at 226. It can be argued that
Judge Bork's interpretation of this precedent was self-servingly designed to avoid the
dictates of Topco. Subsequentto Judge Bork's opinion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its Topco holding in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
159. Judicial Precedent and the New Economics, supra note 122, at 16.
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determine legal rules regulating health and safety.16 His skepticism towards
government intervention in the marketplace appears greatest in the context of
the regulation of economic activity. Despite some critical remarks concerning
the role of the Environmental Protection Agency, Justice Breyer appears more
willing to accept a degree of government interference with the marketplace if
the regulation can be justified on non-economic grounds. He has expressed
the view that regulation of industry may be justified on moral and emotional
grounds, even when economic justifications are lacking. In such instances any
criticism of regulation on purely economic grounds may be misguided. 6'
Justice Breyer has described the distinctive nature of regulation seeking to
promote health and safety:
There is no economics that tells you the right result in that kind of area.
There is no economics that tells you or me or all of us how much we're
prepared to spend or shouldn't spend on the life of another person. There
is nothing that tells us the answer to that in some kind of economics book
that I am aware of. And also, that's so much a decision that people will
make through their elected representatives-its a democratically made
decision.162
Justice Breyer's debate with Justice Scalia is somewhat different from his
disagreements with other conservativejurists. This debate concerns the proper
role that legislative history should play in the interpretation of statutory
language.163 Legislative history might be employed during the first step of
the Chevron analysis, to determine whether or not the statutory language
addresses the precise question at issue." In particular, legislative history
can be used to give meaning to the plain language of the statute where the
language itself is ambiguous. Thus, a reviewing court can use legislative
160. Judge Posner, for example, is well known for his application of economic
theory to legal rules governing social conduct. See TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD
A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMfIC IN AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993).
161. See Stephen G. Breyer, The Economics of AIDS, N.Y. TIMfs, March 6,
1994, § 7, at 24.
162. Hearings on the Breyer Nomination (July 13, 1994) (questioning by Sen.
Biden). See also id. (July 12, 1994) (questioning by Sen. Kennedy) (Justice Breyer
stating that "[w]hen you start talking about health, safety and the environment, the role
[of economics] is much more limited, because there no one would think that
economics is going to tell you how much you want to spend helping the life of another
person. If in fact people want to spend a lot of money to help save earthquake victims
in California, who could say that was wrong?").
163. Cf. Scalia, supra note 139, at 521 with Breyer, supra note 143, at 848-61.
164. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
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history to avoid the second step of the Chevron analysis, which would require
deference to the agency interpretation of the language in cases where the
statutory language is unclear.
Justice Scalia has taken the position that judges engaged in the first step
of the Chevron analysis should limit their inquiry to the plain meaning of the
statutory language, with little or no concern for the legislative history
surrounding the statute.165 Justice Breyer, in contrast, has defended the
traditional use of legislative history as an interpretive tool, albeit a tool with
recognized limitations.'"
Yet, despite his disagreement with Justice Scalia on this point, Justice
Breyer's position does not present a wholesale challenge to the principles that
Justice Scalia espouses. The crux of the debate appears to be that Justice
Breyer would prefer to employ the recognized tools of statutory construction
depending on the facts of the particular case. The circumstances would dictate
whether more or less weight was given to the legislative history in the context
of the particular dispute. Justice Scalia would prefer a more uniform and
mechanical application of the Chevron decision, and would happily abandon
the use of legislative history in order to achieve this goal. 1
III. CONCLUSION
The addition of Justice Breyer to the Supreme Court will add another
sympathetic ear towards the legal concerns of business persons and
corporations. The basic legal principles that often underlie Justice Breyer's
reasoning in business law cases will lead him to interpret the law so as to
minimize the degree to which it interferes with business conduct in the
marketplace. From a business law context, his nomination is one that might
165. See Gellhom, supra note 142, at A19.
166. See Breyer, supra note 143, at 861-69; cf.In re Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27 (1st
Cir. 1985). In this case, Justice Breyer considered whether a provision of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1981), authorizing a
shareholder to sue an investment company and its investment advisor for breach of
fiduciary duty, should be tried in front of a judge or a jury. The plaintiff argued that
the use of the word "damages" in the statute indicated that the plaintiff was entitled to
"legal" remedies and thus had a constitutional right to a jury trial on his claim.
Evangelist, 760 F.2d at 30. Justice Breyer held that the historical treatment of
breaches of fiduciary duty as equitable claims, the legislative history of the statute
indicating an intent to create an equitable remedy, and a persuasive Second Circuit
opinion on the same issue all led to the conclusion that the plaintiff's claim was an
equitable one and that there was no right to a jury trial. Id. at 29-31. In particular,
Justice Breyer placed greater weight on the legislative history of the statute than he did
on the plain statutory language.
167. See Gellhom, supra note 142, at A20.
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well have been acceptable to a Republican administration. One can presume
that it is the moderating effect of Justice Breyer's respect for legislative intent
and prior precedent, as well as his views on legal questions outside of the
business area, that made him an attractive Supreme Court candidate to the
Clinton Administration. In this regard, he is following in the footsteps of his
immediate predecessor to the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. With these
two additions to the Supreme Court, the model for a nominee to the "Clinton
Court" has become apparent: a conservative to moderate approach to business
law issues, coupled with a more liberal approach to social concerns.
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